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is borrowed from the criminal law and is but arbitrary at
best.4" It is suggested that more capacity is required to
understand the nature of a criminal act than is necessary
to the exercise of care for one's own safety.
With this state of the authorities, the Maryland rule
rests in the cases discussed above. The dictum in the Bozman case, which we are discussing, might be considered as
an expression by the Court of Appeals of an inclination to
hold a child of four years of age, or under, free from the
blemishes of contributory negligence. However, in view
of the Zulver case, the first Kolish case, the recognition of
these cases in the Mahan case, and the definite holding of
the Carneal case, that a child not yet three years of age
can be guilty of contributory negligence, it might be better
viewed that the dictum in the instant case is but a misinterpretation of a prior incomplete quotation, rather than
an expression of policy by the Court of Appeals, by which
we could be guided in the future. 1
Hence, the position of Maryland remains with the
minority jurisdictions which allow the negligence vel non
of an infant of such tender years to be decided by the jury
under the proper instructions that such infant is only to be
held to the same degree of care which children of like age
and intelligence would be expected to exercise.
EFFECT OF DISCLOSURE OF DEFENDANT'S COVERAGE BY LIABILITY INSURANCE
Gwynn Oak Park v. Becker 1
A minor child, while visiting Defendant's amusement
park, sustained serious injuries as a result of a fall from a
sliding-board. Suit was brought by his mother, both as
next friend to recover for the injuries the child sustained,
and in her own behalf for loss of his services. Plaintiff's
witness was asked on direct examination whether, at the
time the child was injured, someone from Defendant's
office took a statement from the child; she answered: "I
don't remember, because I was going back and forth. They
may have and may not have, but they were trying to get
,0 Note, Contributory Negligence of Young Children (1937)

L. Q. 55, 57.

41 See a recent case, Stafford v. Zake, 20 A.

1 177 Md. 528, 10 A. (2d) 625 (1940).

(2d)

44 W. Va.

144 (Md., 1941).
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some private doctor, and they had wasted at least ten or
fifteen minutes trying to get in touch with the doctor
because they said it would make a difference in the insurance.' That is what they told us right there." Defendant's motion for a mistrial was overruled, and exception
noted. At the close of Plaintiff's evidence, the jury were
instructed at the request of both sides that the case was
to be decided as if there were no insurance. On appeal,
after verdicts for Plaintiff, held: Affirmed.
The principal case suggests two closely related problems in connection with evidence that a defendant in a negligence suit carries liability insurance, first, whether such
evidence is admissible; second, if such evidence is inadmissible and the existence of insurance is somehow brought
to the jury's attention, what action should the trial court
take in order to prevent its having undue effect on the
jury verdict. Thorough general discussion of these two
problems has appeared elsewhere;8 the present note will
attempt a statement of the rules in a general way, as they
have been developed by Maryland cases.
It is generally agreed that evidence that a defendant
is insured is inadmissible on the substantive issue of negligence. The Maryland Court has clearly recognized this
general rule. In Hall v. Trimble,4 a suit resulting from
the fatal injuring of an employee while working in an
elevator shaft, evidence that the employer carried "casualty insurance" against such accidents was held irrelevant
to the issue of negligence, hence inadmissible. This general rule
of inadmissibility has been approved in later
5
cases.
The reason of policy which explains the rejection of
evidence of the defendant's liability insurance is stated difItalics ours.
56 A. L. R. 1418; 74 A. L. R. 849; 95 A. L. R. 388; 105 A. L. R. 1319: see
also 2 WIGMopR, EVIDEN CE (3d Ed., 1940) Sec. 282A.

'104 Md. 317, 64 A. 1026 (1906).
5 Barnes v. United Rys. Co., 140 Md. 14, 116 A. 855 (1922) ; International

Co. v. Clark, 147 Md. 34, 127 A. 647 (1925) ; Schneider v. Schneider, 160 Md.

18, 152 A. 498, 72 A. L. R. 449 (1930) ; Cluster v. Upson, 165 Md. 566, 168 A.
882 (1933) ; York Ice Machinery Corp. v. Sachs, 167 Md. 113, 173 A. 240
(1934).

These cases expressly or implicitly recognize that evidence of

defendant's insurance is inadmissible on the substantive issue of negligence
as a fundamental rule. The immediate reason for the rule may be the
irrelevance of the offered evidence in the average case; perhaps more important, however, is its recognition of the inherently prejudicial character
of such evidence. Both aspects of the rule have been considered by the
Court of Appeals, as will be developed. For a comprehensive discussion of
the rationale behind the rule, and an excellent argument for Its abolition,
see 2 WIGMORE, op. cit. 8tlpra, 137.
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ferently by different authorities on the subject. One view
is that such evidence is completely irrelevant. Another,
and perhaps the better view is that while it is possibly
relevant, yet it is excluded, not for its irrelevancy, but because, even though relevant, it tends to have a certain
deleterious effect on the verdicts of juries. This latter
view has been aptly expressed by the New Jersey court as
follows: 5a
"The ground of such exclusion is, not that such
evidential matter is lacking in relevancy or devoid of
probative force logically considered, but that, assuming it to be possessed of these qualities, it has been
judicially determined that the introduction of such
facts and inquiries tends in actual operation to produce
a confusion of issues in the mind of the jury and an
unfair prejudice against one of the parties, in excess
of, and indeed in the place of, the legitimate probative
effect of such evidence; in fine, that the true issue
before the jury is thereby obscured, rather than illuminated. It is not, therefore, a rule of evidence based
upon considerations of logic, but a juridical rule based
upon experience. It is the same rule that excludes
proof of the criminal disposition of one accused of
crime.
However, the broad principle of inadmissibility occasionally conflicts with other rules calling for the admission
of evidence indirectly establishing the fact of defendant's
insurance. For example, is plaintiff entitled to question
prospective jurors, on the voir dire, as to an interest in
insurance companies? Obviously, other jurymen would
draw the inference that defendant was insured from such
a question, yet the question might be deemed reasonable,
were it not for that fact. Again, is plaintiff entitled to
question witnesses for bias by showing them to be interested in an insurance company? Neither of these illustrative questions has been answered in the Maryland appellate court, although, apparently, neither technique is practiced in the trial courts of the State.' Where courts are
'a Sutton

v. Bell, 79 N. J. L. 507, 77 A. 42 (1910).
, It is the almost universal rule in personal injury and death actions
throughout the courts of the nation to permit the quizzing of jurors for an
interest in insurance companies, with an eye to challenging them: 56 A. L.
R. 1454; 74 A. L. R. 860; 95 A. L. R. 404; 105 A. L. R. 1330. As to showing
witnesses to be interested in insurance companies in order to establish bias
the rule seems to be the same, within discretionary limits: 56 A. L. R.
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presented with two such conflicting principles, it becomes
necessary that one must yield; yet the relative importance
of the same two principles can differ in each individual
case. It seems likely that exceptions to our rule of inadmissibility will become more numerous, as time goes on.
In Yellow Cab Co. v. Bradin, plaintiff, a passenger in one
cab, was injured when it collided with another operated by
the defendant. An agent who had solicited releases of
plaintiff was asked, on cross-examination by plaintiff,
whom he represented. He answered: "Markel Service."
On being then asked what Markel Service was, he answered over objection that it was an insurance adjustment
agency; motion for a mistrial was denied. 7 In affirming
the trial court's actions, the Court of Appeals stated: 8
"In the present case, a reference to the Markel
Organization was practically unavoidable, and the resulting implication that the defendant had insurance
protection would not have justified a termination of
the trial on that ground, in view of the jury's presumptive knowledge of the legal requirement of public liability insurance for taxicab companies as common carriers."
An extension of this idea of presumptive knowledge of
insurance on the part of juries was indicated in a recent
U. S. District Court case, Tullgren v. Jasper. In a suit by
a taxicab passenger against the taxi company and the
owner of a truck with which the cab collided, the taxi
company sought to implead as third-party defendant the
insurer of the truck; the insurer objected on the ground,
among others, that it was prejudicial thus to inform the
jury that one defendant was insured. The insurer won
out on other grounds, but as to this objection, Judge Chesnut stated:
"While there have been many judicial decisions to
this effect . . . it may be doubted whether now, in
1438; 74 A. L. R. 855; 95 A. L. R. 397; 105 A. L. R. 1326. The writer has
been informed that the local practice is to the contrary, and it leaves no
room for quizzing prospective jurors as to their interest in the insurer
concerned; the defense is supplied with a printed jury-list giving the occupation of each juror, and the name of a juror interested in the particular
insurer involved can be stricken from the list, without informing the
remainder of the jury directly or otherwise of the circumstances.
7 Under local practice, a motion for a mistrial consists of a motion to
withdraw a juror and continue the case.
'172 Md. 388, 392, 191 A. 717, 721 (1937).
'27 F. Supp. 413, 416 (D. C., D. Md., 1939).
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view of the fact that automobile liability insurance
is so general, the rule should be so rigidly applied;
at least, where the practice . . . permits definite legal
instructions to the jury with respect to the legal effect
of insurance in these negligence cases."
The Bradin case seems to indicate that in suits against defendants required to carry liability insurance, the admission of evidence as to this insurance will not be grounds
for appellate reversal-at least, if the evidence is otherwise relevant and proper. The Tullgren case may well
foreshadow some such rule as to all automobile accident
suits.
These two cases suggest what may be true qualifications
to the general rule of inadmissibility. Other qualifications
which have appeared in Maryland cases actually exist
under the doctrine that certain aspects of the rule are
operative only if invoked by opposing counsel. Thus, if
similar evidence of insurance be already in the case without objection," or subsequently further evidence that the
defendant is insured be admitted without protest by the
defendant, 1 clearly the defendant is in no position to press
an exception in the one case, where he has consented to
admission in the other. And if the defendant chooses to
bring out the fact of his insurance from his own witnesses,
he cannot complain if plaintiff's counsel comments legitimately on this evidence. 2
As to our second main problem, assuming that inadmissible evidence of defendant's insurance in a negligence
case has seeped in, through statements of witnesses, plaintiff, or plaintiff's counsel, what course of conduct will be
open to the trial court to cure the defect of admission?
The offending statements can be stricken out and the jury
instructed to disregard them, as was done in the principal
case; 3 or if the court feels that it cannot thus erase the
prejudicial effect of such evidence, it may declare a mistrial by withdrawing a juror and continuing the case for
trial before a new jury. This latter method is by no
means infrequently adopted in Baltimore City trial
10International Co. v. Clark, 147 Md. 34, 43-44, 127 A. 647, 651 (1925).
"1Barnes v. United Rys. Co., 140 Md. 14, 16-17, 116 A. 855, 856 (1922).
Here, similar testimony had also been admitted without objection prior to
the excepted ruling as well.
22 International Co. v. Clark, supra, n. 10.
:1 Supra, n. 1. See also, Kirsch v. Ford, 170 Md. 90, 183 A. 240 (1936).
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courts. 4 It must be invoked by defendant's motion to
withdraw a juror and continue the case.'5 Motion for a
non pros. or dismissal will be properly overruled. 10
Thus, we see that at least two courses of conduct are
open to a trial judge when the fact that the defendant in
a negligence case is insured creeps into the case through
inadmissible evidence, or improper statements of counsel.
Two subordinate inquiries might now be posed: First, in
a given situation, which method is proper; and second,
assuming that trial court chose the wrong one, would an
appellate reversal ensue?
The reason why a new trial might be necessary in
these cases was clearly stated in InternationalCo. v. Clark
as follows:
"... no matter how it should be, all persons who
are familiar with the trial of this class of cases in our
courts know from experience that juries are affected
and influenced by such evidence and statements. In
a case like this, it seems to be natural and a weakness
of human nature to allow the fact that the record defendant will not have to pay the judgment, to influence
the jury in their verdict, and this even though they
have a firm determination
not to allow themselves to
7
be so influenced.'
This statement would seem to be applicable whether the
jury's knowledge of the fact of insurance came from a
deliberate improper statement of plaintiff's counsel or from
a completely unresponsive answer by defendant's witness
on cross-examination. However, the Court of Appeals
seems to have felt the need of a compromise in order to
reduce the number of new trials likely to result if all
statements indicating defendant's insurance called for a
new trial. In the International Co. case and in Ice Machinery Corp. v. Sachs' 8 it was unequivocally stated that
where the suggestion of insurance came from plaintiff, his
counsel or witnesses, whether deliberately or not, a misSee, for example, the cases cited in appellant-defendant's brief in the
principal case: Steining v. Sileski, Sup. Ct. of Baltimore, Mar., 1924;
Tenkersley v. Stabler, Sup. Ct., Feb., 1923; Beatty v. Stewart & Co., Sup.
Ct., Jan., 1924; Brinton v. Henthorn, Baltimore City Ct., Jan., 1923; Brown
v. Hofferbert, Baltimore City Ct., Jan., 1923; Braum v. Coppathite, Baltimore City Ct., Jan., 1923; Brown v. Goldberg, Baltimore City Ct., May, 1924.
"Beam Motor Car Co. v. Loewer, 131 Md. 552, 556, 102 A. 908, 909
(1917) ; International Co. v. Clark, 147 Md. 34, 44, 127 A. 647, 651 (1925).
a Ibid.

Supra, n. 15, 147 Md. 34, 42.
Is 167 Md. 113, 127, 173 A. 240, 246 (1934).
27
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trial should result. On the other hand, in each of the
above cases, the statement showing insurance came from
defendant's witness, and the appellate court held that a
motion for mistrial was properly refused. Both these cases
were cited in Gwynn Oak Park v. Becker, and their holdings seem to have been persuasive, rather than their descriptions of the law; for here the fact of insurance was
brought out by plaintiff's counsel from plaintiff's witness.
The result of the instant case is supported, however, by
Cluster v. Upson.19 There, the plaintiff's counsel deliberately elicited the information from his own witness that
defendant had given witness, driver of the car in which
plaintiff was riding when injured by collision with the defendant, a slip of paper with the name of a third person
and a telephone number on it. Motion for mistrial was
refused, and in affirming the trial Court, the Court of Appeals made this significant statement:
"It is difficult to imagine any purpose in referring
to the paper other than the improper one supposed,
and there is some possibility that it may have carried
to the jury the suggestion feared, and it should not
have been brought out; but the possibility of injury
from it seems to this court too slender to have required
termination of the trial as unsatisfactory; and the
court cannot say that2the
trial court's discretion was
0
improperly exercised.
In Nelson v. Seiler,2 ' in reversing trial court's refusal of a
mistrial when plaintiff's counsel had made frequent attempts to introduce patently inadmissible evidence of defendant's driver's previous conviction for traffic violations,
the Court of Appeals said: "Generally, the choice of
measures to protect the fair, unprejudiced workings of its
proceedings is left to the discretion of the trial court, and
only in exceptional cases will its choice of measures be reviewed in this court.' ' 2 Reference was made thereafter
to International Co. v. Clark. Reference might also be
made to Kirsch v. Ford.23 Suit was for personal injuries
and property damage resulting from collision of plaintiff's
automobile with defendants' truck. An insurance com"165

Md. 566, 568, 168 A. 882 (1933).

2o Italics ours.

21154 Md. 63, 72, 139 A. 564, 567 (1927), citing International Co. v. Clark,
supra, n. 15.
22 Italics again ours.
28 170 Md. 80, 95, 183 A. 240 (1936).
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pany was co-plaintiff for the purpose of recovering its expense under a collision policy issued to plaintiff Ford. One
of the company's agents was allowed to testify that his
company also had outstanding a collision policy on defendant's truck. The statement was made to explain the
agent's knowledge that all three defendants owned the
truck (one had disclaimed ownership). The trial court
carefully instructed the jury that the insurance company
was to be disregarded, and that in no manner would the
insurance inure to the benefit of the individual plaintiff, if
a verdict were forthcoming. The appellate court held that
a mistrial was not necessary under the circumstances, and
affirmed the trial court action; it relied on Cluster v. Upson,
and suggested that there was no inconsistency between
that ruling and InternationalCo. v. Clark. Note, however,
that in Kirsch v. Ford we have testimony concerning insurance given by plaintiff's witness on direct examination,
with no mistrial resulting which would seem on its face
to violate the dictum of International Co. v. Clark.
However, the International Co. case must still carry
considerable weight, in view of the fact that it has been
cited in virtually all succeeding cases dealing with the
problems under discussion. Yet, Cluster v. Upson, Kirsch
v. Ford,and the principal case, Gwynn Oak Park v. Becker,
represent holdings seemingly contra to its dictum. The
logical solution seems to be that the InternationalCo. case
and the Ice Machinery Corp. case, which directly follows
it, enunciate the trial court rule of thumb, while the cases
contra to their statements indicate that the appellate court
will hesitate to reverse the trial court decision departing
from the rule, in recognition of the lower court's opportunity to judge first-hand the probable effect of the statements indicating insurance, and to take what action it may
feel appropriate under the particular circumstances.

